


Fracking Flex

SummerC0n 2010

New York, NY

Because a Flash 0day is so hard to come by...



GOTHAM
DIGITAL • SCIENCE

Fracking Flex

SummerC0n 2010

New York, NY

```
buf[rn] = "%c" % rbyte
```



Who am I?

Marcin Wielgoszewski

- Security Engineer
- Gotham Digital Science



Intro to Flash, Flex and AIR

What is Flex and how does it differ from Flash?

- Flash originally developed for client-side, vector-based animations and video
- Flex provides the framework for building RIA's using the Adobe Flash platform
- AIR allows developers to build desktop applications using Adobe Flash




Adobe LiveCycleDS, BlazeDS, et al.

Utilize existing application logic with Flex

- Provides remoting and messaging capabilities
- Connects backend data services
- Real-time data push to Flash clients



Client / Server Architecture





Channels

Client talks to a server *endpoint* over a Channel

- AMFChannel encapsulates data in AMF
- HTTPChannel encapsulates data in AMFX
- Streaming and Polling channels
- “Secure” channels occur over HTTPS



Endpoints

Channels route requests to a defined endpoint

- Servlet-based – AMF/HTTP
- NIO-based – RTMP/AMF/HTTP
- Endpoints ultimately route to a *destination*




Destinations

Here is where a request will ultimately end up

- Could be one of
 - Remoting service
 - Proxy service
 - Message service



Client / Server Architecture





Action Message Format

Adobe format used for data exchange

- Used over AMFChannel/AMFEndpoints
- Requests are serialized into a compact binary format
- Responses are deserialized and processed
- 7-10x faster over XML*



Peek into AMF

AMF Envelopes contain Request Messages

- One HTTP request/response may have several AMF requests/responses
 - RemotingMessage
 - AsyncMessage / CommandMessage
 - AcknowledgeMessage / ErrorMessage
 - HTTPMessage / SOAPMessage



AMF over the wire

```
0x00000000: 00 03 00 00 00 01 00 04 6e 75 6c 6c 00 02 2f 31 |.....null../1|
0x00000010: 00 00 00 00 0a 00 00 00 01 11 0a 81 13 4f 66 6c |.....Of1|
0x00000020: 65 78 2e 6d 65 73 73 61 67 69 6e 67 2e 6d 65 73 |ex.messaging.mes|
0x00000030: 73 61 67 65 73 2e 52 65 6d 6f 74 69 6e 67 4d 65 |sages.RemotingMe|
0x00000040: 73 73 61 67 65 09 62 6f 64 79 11 63 6c 69 65 6e |ssage.body.clie|
0x00000050: 74 49 64 17 64 65 73 74 69 6e 61 74 69 6f 6e 0f |tId.destination.|
0x00000060: 68 65 61 64 65 72 73 13 6d 65 73 73 61 67 65 49 |headers.messageI|
0x00000070: 64 13 6f 70 65 72 61 74 69 6f 6e 0d 73 6f 75 72 |d.operation.sour|
0x00000080: 63 65 15 74 69 6d 65 54 6f 4c 69 76 65 13 74 69 |ce.timeToLive.ti|
0x00000090: 6d 65 73 74 61 6d 70 09 01 01 01 06 0f 70 72 6f |mestamp.....pro|
0x000000A0: 64 75 63 74 0a 0b 01 09 44 53 49 64 06 49 38 32 |duct....DSId.I82|
0x000000B0: 33 30 44 32 35 31 2d 37 42 31 43 2d 34 44 36 46 |30D251-7B1C-4D6F|
0x000000C0: 2d 39 33 43 45 2d 45 30 30 41 33 41 42 37 37 46 |-93CE-E00A3AB77F|
0x000000D0: 34 41 15 44 53 45 6e 64 70 6f 69 6e 74 06 0d 6d |4A.DSEndpoint..m|
0x000000E0: 79 2d 61 6d 66 01 06 49 45 33 38 39 42 45 45 41 |y-amf..IE389BEEA|
0x000000F0: 2d 46 45 32 45 2d 34 43 37 45 2d 42 31 44 30 2d |-FE2E-4C7E-B1D0-|
0x00000100: 37 33 31 43 46 44 31 30 46 41 36 32 06 17 67 65 |731CFD10FA62..ge|
0x00000110: 74 50 72 6f 64 75 63 74 73 01 01 01 |tProducts...|
```



Identifying message properties

burp suite professional v1.3 - licensed to Gotham Digital Science [4 user license]

burp intruder repeater window help

spider scanner intruder repeater sequencer decoder comparer options alerts

history

File Edit View HTTP and image content

#	url	method	URL	params	mod	status	length
16	http://172.16.247.130:8400	GET	/samples/testdrive-remoteobject/index.html			200	4497
17	http://172.16.247.130:8400	GET	/samples/testdrive-remoteobject/AC_OETags.js			200	8853
18	http://172.16.247.130:8400	POST	/samples/messagebroker/amf			200	537
19	http://172.16.247.130:8400	POST	/samples/messagebroker/amf?sessionId=18A6C95...	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		200	4631

request response

raw params headers hex amf

	type	value
AMF version 3		
body		
a target	string	null
a response	string	/1
a response method	string	null
[] data	array	
[0]	RemotingMessage	
Body	array	
a Operation	string	getProducts
Source		
RemoteUsername	null	
RemotePassword	null	
a MessageId	string	B218DE47-5EA7-8525-39FF-DEC3C6F5E646
ClientId	null	
Headers	map	
a	string	56DBF984-571B-380F-89F2-79BBBF8A704F
a DSEnvelope	string	my-amf
1 TimeToLive	number	0
a Destination	string	product
1 Timestamp	number	0

The endpoint

The operation called

The destination service

The channel id



AMF RemotingMessage

Send RPC's to remote service methods

- Contain the following attributes
 - body
 - destination
 - operation
 - and more...



Flex Remoting Services

Send complex data structures to services


- Data types and object are preserved from client to server
- Client side Flash ValueObjects interact with backend POJOs



Complex Data Structures

body is an array of objects

- `body[0]` = string
- `body[1]` = `java.util.Date`
- `body[2]` = `java.util.Date`
- `body[3]` = array [
– string, string, string]
- `body[4]` = map {
– [string, string, string] }



Fracking Flex

RECONNAISSANCE

Is it time for flip cup yet?!?



Identify Services and Methods

Inspect the traffic through an HTTP proxy

- Burp Suite, WebScarab, Charles, Wireshark
- Identify the
 - Destination service
 - Operation
 - Endpoint
- How many parameters (and type) are passed?



Decompiling SWFs

The beauty of having client-side code

- AS and MXML is compiled to bytecode
- Developers expose all sorts of good stuff
 - Usernames and passwords
 - URLs and connection strings
 - Hidden functionality
 - and other sensitive data



Decompiling SWFs

Common strings to look for in decompiled code

- RemoteObject | WebService | HTTPService
- .destination | .operation | .useProxy
- get | set | add | remove | create | delete



Local SharedObjects

Persistent “cookies” that reside on filesystem

- Often used to save UI preferences
- Sometimes find cool stuff
 - Session IDs
 - User/Role information
 - Sensitive data

Fracking Flex

ATTACKING REMOTING SERVICES



Enumerating Remoting Services

Do methods/destinations show a pattern?

- Try calling other methods that might be there
 - DeBlaze attempts to enumerate by bruteforce



I got 99 Messages

But my HTTP requests' only one

- Remember, an AMF Envelope can contain more than one Request
- Can we enumerate in just one HTTP request?

Remoting Services

DEMO



A Quick Comparison

Significantly reduce bytes sent and time to test

- Same technique can be applied to fuzzing
- For example...

530 separate HTTP requests

- 150 bytes of headers
- Content-Length: 282
- 1 destination: 1 method
- About 3 minutes

1 HTTP request to do it all:

- 155 bytes of headers
- Content-Length: 148538
- 1 destination: 530 methods
- < 3 seconds



Custom ValueObjects

The server complains about invalid types. WTF?

"Cannot convert type java.lang.String with value 'marcin' to an instance of class flex.samples.crm.employee.Employee"

- The client binds ActionScript ValueObjects to server-side POJO's
- Simply passing a string, boolean or an integer isn't enough



Reversing a ValueObject

Well then, what do we do now?

- Decompile client-side code
- Identify the object's namespace
- Identify the object members that are set
- Read the AMF spec and start reversing...



Creating ValueObjects

Use PyAMF or similar API to create a VO

- Define your class and class members
- Alias the class with a namespace
- Pass object as parameter to method



Crafting VO's with Python

```
# Below is some Python-fu for creating an Object Factory
class Factory(object):
    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
        self.__dict__.update(kwargs)

# Register our object factory with a class alias
pyamf.register_class(Factory, "flex.samples.crm.employee.Employee")

# Instantiate a "Employee" using our object factory:
marcin = Factory(**{'firstName': "Marcin",
                    'lastName': "Wielgoszewski",
                    'phone': "555-555-5555",
                    'email': "labs@gdssecurity.com",})
```

Custom ValueObjects

DEMO

Fracking Flex

WE HOP THESE THROUGH PROXIES

So your packet log is nothing...




BlazeDS Proxy Services

Connect Flex applications to backend services

- Request resources from another domain
- AMF/X wrapped HTTP/SOAP requests



Proxy Service Architecture





AMF HTTPMessage / SOAPMessage

BlazeDS will call a destination on client's behalf

- Get around crossdomain policy restrictions
- Don't want to expose internal service publicly
- HTTP methods supported
 - GET, POST, HEAD, OPTIONS, TRACE, DELETE



Pivoting Intranets through BlazeDS

Proxy Services have inherent risks

- Proxy Services often configured insecurely
- Expose internal/Intranet apps to world
- Culprit? wildcards in *proxy-config.xml*
 - `<dynamic-url>*</dynamic-url>`
 - `<soap>*</soap>`



WEB-INF\flex\proxy-config.xml


```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<service id="proxy-service" class="flex.messaging.services.HTTPProxyService">
..snip..

    <destination id="catalog">
        <properties>
            <dynamic-url>*</dynamic-url>
        </properties>
    </destination>

    <destination id="ws-catalog">
        <properties>
            <wsdl>http://livecycledata.org/services/ProductWS?wsdl</wsdl>
            <soap>*</soap>
        </properties>
        <adapter ref="soap-proxy"/>
    </destination>
```



Proxy Service Architecture





Blazentoo

A tool to exploit Proxy Services

- Browse websites reachable from server
 - Hello Intranet applications!
- Can also be a crude port scanner
 - Just specify another port
 - Connection might get refused, reset or stay open...

Blazentoo

DEMO

So f*k your firewall trying to hide your ports



Some Peculiar Behavior...

Destination server response header leakage?

- Proxy request to <http://www.google.com/>

HTTP/1.1 200 OK

..snip..

Server: Apache-Coyote/1.1

Set-Cookie: FLEX_1703289594_47_NID=<blah>; Path=/
Server: gws

Server: gws

X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block



Flex Assessment Methodology

Let's recap:

- Passively analyze traffic
- Decompile SWF and identify stored secrets
- Enumerate services, methods & endpoints
 - Input validation, fuzzing, etc
 - Check enforcement of AuthN and AuthZ controls
- Exploit insecure configurations



Thanks!

SummerC0n and everyone else who came

- NYSEC crew and all who've seen this 3x now
- My fellow GDS colleagues

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<http://www.gdssecurity.com>

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QUESTIONS?





References

References

BlazeDS Developer Guide - http://livedocs.adobe.com/blazeds/1/blazeds_devguide/

GDS Security Blog - <http://www.gdssecurity.com/l/b/>

Tools

Burp Suite - <http://portswigger.net/suite/>

Charles Proxy - <http://www.charles.com/>

DeBlaze - <http://deblaze-tool.appspot.com/>

Libraries

PyAMF - <http://www.pyamf.org/>

RubyAMF - <http://rubyamf.org/>

AMF::Perl - <http://www.simonf.com/flap/>



AMFX

Uses an HTTPChannel/HTTPEndpoint

- AMF objects are serialized to **XML**
- Usually provided as a fallback channel
- Different channel == different endpoint
 - URL for AMFX endpoint will differ from AMF



Message serialized to AMFX

```
<amfx ver="3"
  xmlns="http://www.macromedia.com/2005/amfx">
  <body>
    <object type="flex.messaging.messages.HTTPMessage">
      <traits>
        <string>body</string>
        <string>clientId</string>
        ..snip..
      </object>
    </body>
  </amfx>
```




AMF CommandMessage

is used to... send commands!


- Mechanism for sending commands related to publish/subscribe, ping, cluster operations
 - Ping
 - Login / Logout
 - Subscribe / Unsubscribe
 - and more..



Complex Data Structures Revisited

body is an array of objects

- `body[0]` = string
- `body[1]` = `java.util.Date`
- `body[2]` = `java.util.Date`
- `body[3]` = array [
– string, string, string]
- `body[4]` = map {
– [string, string, string] }





Complex Data Structures Revisited

Check your API's language type mapping

- Python datetime = date
- Python int/float/long = number
- Python list/tuple = array
- Python dict = map