tssci security

Software Security: a retrospective

Today I am going to cover a topic that is the most important to me: software security. When I talk about "software security", I refer to the process of building applications -- the artifacts, components, and capital that goes into making a polished product. Applications are something that development teams worldwide strive to be proud of -- to make something that is used and adored by its userbase.

Traditionally, software has been built using an inaccurate paradigm. First, the software is constructed by ad-hoc teams, with ad-hoc decision-making, ad-hoc deadlines, and an informal process. This informal process describes the majority of applications that have been released to the public, or sold to specific customers, over my entire lifetime.

In this blog post, my goal is to arm you with the most accurate information possible to build your dream application. However, there is a cost involved. That cost is that the software be built in a secure manner -- one that avoids overly common software weaknesses known to criminals, known to adversaries, known to any would-be attacker. From software engineers on their own to development teams part of the largest of organizations, this advice may keep you from making the headline news with the words "vulnerability" or "exploit" attached, but may make you news such as "committed to secure practices" or "most secure app in its class". There will certainly be gaps, primarily due to the human factor (applications can still be gamed and reduced to trivial "phishing-like" attacks against the users of such apps).

Attacks against people will always be valid attacks for threats such as online organized crime and the nefarious crimeware created out of such circles. However, there is a new hope in software security: a promise that when broken windows are repaired -- that the streets will stay clean. With a clean street to walk upon, it is then up to the community to solve the people problems. At least in the case of acute software security practices -- an application's community -- it's users -- get to stand on firm ground for any fights that transpire. If you're real good, you'll take this advice even further to solve any risk factors facing your applications.

Issue One: Identify and expose risk

Summary --Risk first; security second. Find a risk expert. Use him/her for planning.

Problem --Understand the risks that your applications face, preferably before you design or build them. If you haven't yet started a development project, this is the best time to formalize the risk process. If you already have a completed application or a whole product suite -- risk management is intensely more complex.

There are many people in the world that are fluent in the language of risk. If you have a CPA, physician, or lawyer, then you understand that he/she is probably one of the better people to go to for general-life risk advice. In the world of computed applications, it is unlikely that this same person will have the credentials necessary to help you.

We need software risk experts. The best way to learn about software risks is by involving yourself in a formal software development lifecycle. In other words, requirements engineers, software architects, developers, and software quality engineers make some of the best software risk experts.

However, the current world's threat landscape changes modern software risk. Adversaries have outsmarted and outgunned the average software risk expert by introducing esoteric attack-paths by using widely unknown and misunderstood weaknesses in software. Everyone who thinks that they are an expert in software risk must now worry about the intricacies of SQL injection, cross-site scripting, integer vulnerabilities, and heap overflows -- in addition to deadlock/livelock, exception-handling, and the forbidden "crash" issues of the past.

Recommendation -- Super spies, organized criminals, and federal law-enforcement field agents all have one thing in common: they don't operate alone.

Find some risk experts and heed their advice. You'll want recommendations, but I suggest you avoid the typical places one would go. For example, people assume that the PCI SSC regulates good QSAC's to do code review, or ASV's to do application scanning. Other people assume that Microsoft, Symantec, SANS, or another vendor has "the inside track" for security information. These are largely fallacies, due to the following issues:

That said, I won't make any specific recommendations today since I am contractually obligated by my employer to avoid such details, and naming competitors would be an unfair advantage. My suggestion is to find a solutions provider that has intimate knowledge of the other issues brought up in this post. If you find a software risk management provider that addresses my issues in their entirety, it is quite likely that they will suffice for software risk planning. Of course, nothing is stopping you from commenting about a software risk solutions provider that you've worked with or are looking to work with in the future.

Honorable mention -- NSA Red team white-boarding. Crimeware, especially the recent botwebworms going around. That special way that Taiwan and China interact over the Internet.

Issue Two: Perform security requirements engineering

Summary -- 60% of all defects exist by design time (Gilb 1988). Reworking a software requirements problem once the software is in operation typically costs 50 to 200 times what it would take to rework the problem in the requirements stage (Boehm and Papaccio 1988). Statistics taken from Software Quality at Top Speed, adaptation for software security found in Business Case Best Practices on the Build Security In website.

Quality and Security are intertwined; they depend on each other. How can a CIO be focused on CMMI, yet at the same time be reluctant to enhance their process with a security development lifecycle? Requirements engineering has been proven time and time again for both quality and security purposes as the most beneficial exercise to increase defect prevention, as well as to lower the cost of existing defects.

Resources (primarily acquired from the book, *Software Security Engineering: A Guide for Project Mangers*):

Problem -- In this process, the difficulty often comes with decision-making. Pragmatic managers and analytic engineers could bounce off each other or blow up under the wrong conditions. SixSigma would tell the metrics-oriented business analyst to use a scorecard and focus on the "voice of the customer". Evangelical venture capitalists would say, "requirements-gathering doesn't ship code". Customers would foolishly say, "we trust you to make these decisions for us". Engineers with experience, either real-world or academic, might even oppose these views with fervor.

The book referenced above, Software Security Engineering: A Guide for Project Managers, discusses processes of decision-making, `eliciting security requirements', and trade-offs. They don't mention paralysis by analysis, or the fact that development teams often fail to read the specifications (or a multitude of other issues). I opt for their views, but the reality of what I see/hear going on is viciously to the contrary.

Organizations typically hate requirements.

Recommendation -- After having spent some time in an operational role, I watched how others deal with compromising vendor negotiations and acute attention-deficit disorders among IT decision-makers. Without bothering you with the horror-stories, I can say two simple words about negotiation that exists outside of political situations where one side clearly has the upper hand: Win-win. Win-win and other strategies are available in the Software Security Engineering book, as well as on the Build Security In website's Requirements Engineering section.

The tricky situation is to make sure you have a level playing field to start with. This is where the software risk experts come in. Balance the needs of release engineering/scoping (e.g. responsible manager) with your quality risk experts (e.g. lead developer) and your security risk expert provider. Be sure not to forget the customer, if they want to have any say at all.

I suggest MediaWiki as a base platform for requirements engineering documentation. A balance of documentation/tagging between the responsible parties would be beneficial to all. Code-level requirements specifications can be more easily integrated with software projects using open-source tools such as FitNesse (and HtmlFixture if the application is web-based), or commercial products such as HP TestDirector and IBM RequisitePro.

Honorable mention -- Fagan inspection and the V-Model SDLC representation

Issue Three: Design and construct secure software

Special Note -- You can skip this issue if you don't have any software that is worth defect-tracking. You will also have to skip ahead to Issue Four if your primary goal is to secure an existing application. You'll return to this issue later when you have to re-code that application due to existing defects.

Summary -- There are only two correct paths. Choose one and go as deep with it as necessary. The necessary parts will be well-defined depending on the path that you choose. Both mandatory and optional processes for designing, inspecting, and testing software for correct security properties will be proscribed.

  1. Model-driven development
  2. Test-driven development

Problem -- No product, service, or hodge-podge of free/open-source software/methods exists that will put your software together for you and make it a secure application. No A-Team or B-Team is available for hire to design, build, inspect, or test your software to make it a secure application. You are on your own.

Recommendation -- Well, that all depends. This is the hard part.

You need:

  1. Defect-tracking system and formalized process
  2. Design or test-case specification/management tool and formalized process
  3. Time management with a formal process
  4. Defect prioritization list (must come from your software risk experts and carved in stone)

Path One additional criteria: Model-driven development should generate some or all of the code necessary to complete a software project from the specification. Any of the code not generated using model-driven development must use test-driven development. The specification can be generated using:

If you or your software risk expert do not know what formal methods are, or why you would need them, then you probably don't want this. Instead, investigate semi-formal methods.

  1. Model-driven engineering (MDE) using NModel with C# .NET or Software Factories
  2. Model-driven architecture (MDA) using Andro MDA with Java Enterprise Edition
  3. Executable UML (xUML) for object-oriented languages such as C++ or Objective-C

Again, skip this if you or your risk expert are unaware of the benefits to using semi-formal methods to code generate software. Instead, rely on informal methods (and all of the other required steps) that go along with Path Two.

Path Two additional criteria: Test-driven development uses informal design methods combined with test-first development.

  1. DFD or UML diagram analysis with an automated tool such as Klocwork K7's architectural analysis module and/or manually by a threat-modeling expert
  2. Privilege-centric security analysis with Trike performed by a threat-modeling expert. This is typically a manual process
  3. Threat-modeling with Microsoft TAM-E (or the free, classic Threat Analysis and Modeling v2.1.2 tool) performed by a threat-modeling expert. This is also a manual-only process
  1. Writing unit tests before construction of software
  2. Unit tests should assert for the defect's fix and run continuously so that regression testing is integrated
  3. Design and construction of code in short "sprints" which allow for re-prioritization of security defects before, during, and after every sprint
  4. Continuous refactoring, which may typically take up to 50% or more of the each construction phase during every sprint

See: Agile Security - Breaking the Waterfall Mindset of the Security Industry and the presentation by Dave Wichers of Aspect Security for more ideas on test-first development.

Honorable mention-- The Microsoft SDL. Cigital Touchpoints. OWASP CLASP. My Continuous-Prevention Security Lifecycle (CPSL). SSE-CMM, et al.

Issue Four: Raise awareness and identify root-cause issues

Summary -- There are many ways to raise awareness and do root-cause analysis. Sometimes the fastest/cheapest way is the best way.

Often, the fastest way is with an automated security review checker program such as CAT.NET (XSSDetect is free), FindBugs, PMD, CheckStyle, FxCop, StyleCop, SWAAT, PHP-SAT, Orizon/Milk, Pixy, ITS4, RATS, SPIN (all free), Checkmarx, Ounce, Klockwork K7, GrammaTech CodeSonar, or Fortify SCA (all pay-commercial).

Less likely, a fault-injection or fuzz testing tool can be used -- such as Compuware SecurityChecker, automated web application security scanners (especially ones that are meant to work at the development or QA level such as DevInspect, QAInspect, or AppScan DE), or a concolic unit testing engine such as jCUTE (free).

My favorite technology solution to this problem is the tried and true white-box dynamic analysis method, with tools in this class such as Coverity Prevent, Fortify PTA, Insure++, Purify (pay-commercial) or Valgrind (free). Other possibilities here are code-comprehension tools such as SciTools Understand, Atlassian Clover, Bullseye Coverage (pay-commercial), EMMA, PartCover, NCover, tcov, gcov, and lcov (free).

Sometimes, an overhead view of the UML diagrams with Klockwork K7, Rational Rose (pay-commercial) or even UMLGraph or GoVisual Diagram Editor (free) will be enough.

It could be that the fastest/cheapest way is to simply do an interview with the lead developer(s). They might already know. They might be on your side.

Once you've identified an issue -- the only action is governance to get Issues 1-3 approved and committed to. This means C-Level involvement at the highest level of any organization.

Problem -- Nobody cares. This isn't the way things normally happen. This isn't the way we do things around here. We don't have funding. We don't have time. We don't have resources. Maybe next year.

Recommendation -- Be creative. Listen. Write. Peer review. Speak. Don't screw it up and don't "consider other options". What if you could get Steve Jobs to run LookingGlass.exe and see the obvious problems with QuickTime? We need more tools like this at the tactical level. GRC tools such as Agilance, Archer, and ControlPath are too strategic and "high in the clouds" (as well as too expensive).

Honorable mention -- Application security in all of its ugly and twisted forms. IDS, IPS, WAF, and logging. Black-box web application security scanners. Manual pen-testing. These may raise awareness. They may solve some problems locally, temporarily -- but not systemically. They do not involve root-cause.

Posted by dre on Thursday, May 29, 2008 in Code, Defense and Security.

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