tssci security

Web Application Security Tomorrow

Jeremiah Grossman wrote in the opinion section for Application security in CSO Online magazine about Web Application Security Today -- Are We All Insane?

I have an opinion of my own which I would like to share with my readers. Jeremiah spreads FUD -- Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt (mostly fear) in his message. I wanted to walk through some parts of what he wrote that were especially messages of fear, particularly ones that are over-blown.

Seventeen million programmers are churning out an estimated 102 billion new lines of code per year. [...] Web application exposure has reached the crisis stage because criminals have taken notice and made Web applications their primary target. There's an old proverb that explains how to determine whether or not someone is sane. An individual is shown a river flowing into a pond. He is given a bucket and asked to drain the pond. If he walks to the stream to dam the inflow into the pond he will be considered sane. If he decides to empty the pond with his bucket without first stopping the inflow then he would be considered insane. This is analogous to today's approach to software security, and specifically Web application security.

Many of us (including myself) know exactly where Jeremiah is going with this. However, my addition is that the purity of the water in his example is what is important -- not the flood of code. We shouldn't slow down the production of code, or put an end to it.

The techniques used by the modern cyber-criminal are truly scary. They're backed by mafia, supported by nation states, and often even carried out by, or in conjunction with, rogue insiders. We are dealing with polymorphic malware, 100,000-computer strong botnets, drive-by-downloads, rootkits with anti-forensic capabilities conducted by adversaries who fear no U.S. law. The bad guys make certain their newest tricks are packed, encrypted, and undetectable by the most popular security products.

While some of this FUD is certainly true to a point, we don't have any specific measurements on the reality of our situation. What Jeremiah purports as fact is merely theory, speculation, and potentially myth.

Think the payment card industry's new regulations or the breach disclosure laws are going to save us? Neither do I, but they certainly do make a good excuse to get more budget dollars.

I've been having a lot of interesting conversations about compliance with my colleagues lately. It's been indicated to me that PCI-DSS is not the only compliance standard or regualation that has a framework to enforce application security or application penetration-testing. Stranger, the "cost of a breach" isn't the only cost of insecurity.

Marcin and I were discussing an article on Sound compliance polices, practices reduce legal costs. I had other discussions about cyber-insurance in the Security Catalyst community regarding a presentation at the recent Defcon conference from Taylor Banks and Carric on [PDF] The pentest is dead, long live the pentest! At the end of their presentation, Taylor and Carric provide a long list of cyber-insurance providers -- extremely useful for anyone unaware of such a thing or looking to buy. In David Rice's book, Geekonomics, David makes mention of AIG's cyber-insurance offerings and how the ISAlliance and AIG provide discounts to ISAlliance members who implement security-framework controls. In other words, doing compliance "right" not only buys protection from the regulators, but it also demonstrates cost-improvements for legal and insurance activity.

Another conversation with colleague Adam Muntner discussed how "compliance readiness" is both more profitable and more enjoyable than compliance work itself. Many organziations realize that the time and effort it takes to pass any given set of criteria for an audit standard, so they prepare themselves ahead of time using experts in application risk, network penetration-testing, and application penetration-testing. What most organizations are looking for is custom-tailored advice in the form of strategy consulting, not just another fancy report that they can give to the auditors.

Compliance and breach disclose laws could possibly be the primary motivators towards spending on application security, but there is certainly more at work here. If compliance is driving application security, then what is driving compliance?

Want to rent a 10,000-computer botnet for the day? No problem. Unreported vulnerabilities (zero-days) are being researched, bought, and sold on the black market for tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars. At the same time, when software patches are released, attackers are immediately (it is rumored, automatically) reverse-engineering them to find the flaw. Exploit code is then sent back into the wild before patches can be widely deployed by legitimate users. Large-scale patch rollouts taking only a few days seems like a great advancement until compared against exploit code ready to go in hours.

Here's where Jeremiah's FUD really kicks in. I don't know where his sources are, but the factual nature of this information should definitely come into question. I have heard of one or two exploits that have been sold for US 30,000 dollars. However, this is not the norm. The rumors of automatic reverse-engineering of patches into exploits has been disproved, so why make mention of it? Even the Asprox botnet that coordinated the SQL injection attacks is over one year old -- and I'm certain that a large majority of Enterprises are patched. The clear target of the malware behind the SQL injection attacks is consumers, particularly those whose Windows XP operating system has some sort of automatic update deficiency or mis-configuration.

In response to the inadequacies of first-generation Web application security measures, an entire industry has emerged beating the drum for software in the Software Development Lifecycle (SDL) and touting secure software as the cure to all our woes.

Actually, application security principles have been around for a lot longer! I think that security in the SDLC has definitely been talked about before the invention of the web. The only concepts that I've seen emerge from the "inadequacies of first-generation Web application security measures" that have been "beating their drums" and touting their solutions as the cure to all our woes are:

Secure code review has been a concept that I've been aware of since OpenBSD opened their doors. Improving software development processes for both quality and security go back in the literature to the 1970's. Unit testing, and security unit testing, are relatively new concepts -- but certainly not as new as WASS or WAF!

Secure code review is a competitive sport that is different than the sales/marketing approach of security product vendors. When Theo de Raadt, a renown (some would say notorious) NetBSD core member who had an appetite for application security branched OpenBSD from NetBSD -- he didn't have it directly in mind that he and his team would scour their source code looking for security-related bugs. However, the NetBSD team provided some extra competitive eyes on the OpenBSD commits -- looking especially hard on security-related bugs to embarrass Theo and crew. From this back-and-forth competitive challenge -- the application security industry was really born.

Certainly, some will claim that fuzz testing was invented earlier. However, before OpenBSD -- security-related bugs were found mostly by accident (while looking for something else). If they were found on purpose, like in the case of the Morris Internet worm, it was a personal matter -- potentially shared by a group, but not taken on by a group, rarely even in academia.

One could claim that WASS has its roots in fuzz testing, while WAF has its roots in packet filtering or the classic network firewall. Unlike those two: security unit testing, secure code review, and white-box dynamic analysis have really not changed much over time. When I use Javascript breakpoints in FireBug, it is strikingly similar to using gdb.

In today's world, there is an unimaginable amount of insecure code, and therefore websites, already in circulation. Just taking up the battle cry of "secure software" alone does not solve this problem. As Web 2.0 applications continue to proliferate (blogs, social networks, video sharing, mash-up websites, etc.) the problem will expand in parallel, but we also must consider the existing large financial institutions, credit unions, healthcare operators, ecommerce retailers that run mission-critical business applications online. Even our 2008 U.S. presidential candidates are having trouble securing their campaign websites against amateur attackers.

It's interesting how Jeremiah views "secure software" as a battle cry. For many security-focused developers, this isn't a war -- it's just a way of coding properly. Maybe he pictures that the war is "secure software vs. WASS+WAF", which from his wallet's perspective -- might be right. I am having some issues separating application penetration-testing and general application security, but I don't see it anywhere near as bad as the case that Jeremiah has got.

The one thing about the above paragraph that is potentially very sad is that he calls XSS bugfinders "attackers" -- "amateur attackers" at that. There were no real attacks against the presidential candidates' websites -- there were just some vulnerability findings. No exploits were written or used. Jeremiah really has a way of twisting words around -- maybe he should be working for one of the presidential candidates!

Application security vs. Application penetration-testing

Some of us choose to focus our efforts on penetration-testing -- finding bugs in the code that can be used as an exploit. Others focus just on building the code with security in mind -- to enhance security. This is an important distinction.

In a recent presentation entitled [PDF] Code Scanning: Success and Failure in the Field, Alex Stamos discussed some differences between false-positives and non-exploitables. Sure, black-box web application scanners, including SaaS vendors such as WhiteHatSec indeed find exploitable conditions. This comes at a serious cost.

Problems with black-box web application security scanners, including and especially WhiteHatSec:

  1. The penetration-test runs unencrypted over the Internet, exposing not only a MITM condition, but various types of proxy and logging problems
  2. Anyone in this path -- present or future -- may gain (potentially illegal) access to these exploits, pre-built for them, so that almost no knowledge or expertise is required on their part to run them
  3. Changing an exploit so that it bypasses WASS+WAF is often trivial
  4. Use of an encrypted VPN or testing on the local LAN does not settle this problem, it only protects some of the path involved

I think Jeremiah said it best himself:

The techniques used by the modern cyber-criminal are truly scary. They're backed by mafia, supported by nation states, and often even carried out by, or in conjunction with, rogue insiders.

What I propose is that it is safer and easier to avoid the exploitability arguments. Who cares if something is exploitable or not? A better question is: how obviously secure is the code?

Advantages of security unit testing, secure code review, and white-box dynamic analysis:

  1. No exploits means that no rogue insiders can steal them and give them to adversaries
  2. Source code is full-knowledge. There is nothing "black-box" about it, so every software weakness and vulnerability can theoretically be found
  3. These practices encourage finding security-related bugs "accidentally", which includes new classes of vulnerabilities (often referred to as software weakness research)

Certainly, I have some ideas and products in mind when I think of true application security tools: security unit test frameworks (which don't exist), security code review tools, and white-box dynamic analysis, or hybrid/composite analysis. However, the primary focus should be on the expertise needed to perform application security tasks, the process in place to allow individuals and teams to rise to the occasion, and guidance/governance from organizational figureheads and leaders.

It is unreasonable to expect publishers, enterprises and other site owners to restart and reprogram every website securely from scratch. Nor can we fix the hundreds of thousands (maybe millions) of custom Web application vulnerabilities one line at time.

Jeremiah thinks that developers work with source code one line at a time. They don't. Modern developers utilize techniques such as metaprogramming, code generation, templating, and model-driven architecture. They're programmers, why wouldn't they write programs to help them develop other applications?!

Some web applications are so legacy, that they require re-writing from scratch -- however we don't have numbers or statistics on this amount. Also note that if Jeremiah is going to only include SSL web applications as important -- than he should also include them in these numbers as well.

Developers have been using unit testing frameworks, IDE features, and processes such as iterative programming, Extreme programming, and Agile to help them refactor their applications for quite some time now. Refactoring does not require re-writing from scratch. With refactoring, developers can restructure the design of their applications by tweaking small parts of the code. Dependency injection, Aspect-oriented programming, and Attribute-oriented programming make this faster -- as do general development concepts such as Design-by-contract, Test-driven development, Reflective programming, and many others. Some of these practices don't even require use of an object-oriented language -- let alone an Enteprise web application programming language such as Java Enterprise or ASP.NET.

There are numerous books on refactoring the Web, databases, and specific programming languages. Some languages have used metaprogramming to build refactoring, unit testing, TDD, and many other quality/security-control concepts into the entire framework -- such as Rails for Ruby.

Our pond is actually an ocean of code in need of security defect purification and the dams in the rivers feeding it have holes requiring patches. In many ways, the state of Web application security is where we started a decade or so ago in network security when no one really patched or even had the means to do so.

I dislike how Jeremiah fails to bring this analogy back around in order to prove any point. If WASS+WAF is supposed to signify blocking the inflow of water, this neither cleans up the already dirty pond, nor does it prevent the acidic/polluted water from immediately disintegrating the wooden plug that is supposed to stop the inflow.

This approach lets us mitigate the problem now giving us breathing room to fix the code when time and budget allow. Of course there is still the option of waiting the next 10 years for the Web to be rebuilt.

If classic firewalls and virtual-patching didn't work the first time around -- what makes people think they're going to work now?

The web does not require 10 years to be rebuilt -- especially not the SSL web. It requires smart developers with metaprogramming, refactoring, and high-efficiency skills that can be focused towards security. Do not hire cowboy coders. Hire developers that can utilize and spread TDD, Design-by-contract, metaprogramming, and code generation concepts and tools throughout your organization. Hire application security experts that can work with these super-developers. Train and promote modern, secure development practices to every developer-newbie, veteran developer -- and every network, application, or information security professional.

Posted by dre on Thursday, September 11, 2008 in Security.

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